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This paper is concerned with the time-series patterns of mortality, in-
come, and income inequality in the United States and in Britain. One start-
ing point is Deaton and Paxson (2001), in which we used pooled time-series
and cross-sectional data from the United States to estimate a strong pro-
tective eﬀect of income across birth cohorts that closely matched estimates
from individual-level data from the National Longitudinal Mortality
Study. We found no evidence for the proposition that year and age-speciﬁc
income inequality is a health hazard; indeed, our regressions found protec-
tive eﬀects of higher inequality, essentially because for adults aged thirty-
ﬁve and over in the United States, mortality declined more rapidly during
the period of rapid increase in income inequality in the 1980s than it did in
the 1970s, before income inequality began to increase.
In this paper, we extend our analysis to British data, and to a compara-
tive examination of the British and American mortality experience, over
time and across age groups. The comparison between the two countries is
interesting in part because of the diﬀerent systems of health care, one
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and Jim Smith for comments and suggestions.country with universal, albeit often rationed, coverage and the other with
largely private provision until Medicare at age sixty-ﬁve. Comparative
analysis is also useful because there are both similarities and diﬀerences in
patterns of income in the two countries. Although changes in income in-
equality are similar in Britain and the United States, patterns of income
growth are not. According to purchasing power parity (PPP) estimates, in-
comes are higher in the United States than in Britain, but in recent years
real incomes have been growing more rapidly in Britain. Both countries ex-
perienced historically large increases in income inequality in the 1980s.
Section 6.2 presents an examination of the patterns of income, income
inequality, and mortality in the two countries over the last half century.
Section 6.3 is concerned with an age-speciﬁc and time-series analysis of
mortality and income in Britain and with the comparison of the results
with those from the United States.
6.2 Patterns of Mortality in Britain and the United States since 1950
We begin our discussion with an examination of changes in mortality in
the United States and in Britain over the period 1950 to 2000, particularly
in relation to changes in income and income inequality. In this section, we
rely entirely on graphical analysis. Figure 6.1 shows the data on income
and income inequality. The top panels show measures of real income in the
two countries, and the bottom panels show measures of income inequality.
The two panels on the left are for the United Kingdom, and the two panels
on the right are for the United States. The top left panel shows two indica-
tors of real income. The lower curve shows real personal disposable income
in pounds per capita at 1999 prices; this series is taken from the national in-
come and product accounts. The upper curve, available for a shorter time
period, and calculated from survey data, shows median household dispos-
able income. Apart from the diﬀerent methodologies and the fact that
households typically contain more than one person, the two series show
similar business cycle and trend behavior over the period when both are
available.
Data on income inequality are more controversial than data on income
levels. There are many diﬀerent estimates of the Gini coeﬃcient of income
inequality in the United Kingdom, diﬀering by concept and by source. The
earlier Gini coeﬃcient shown in the bottom left panel, Gini (a), comes
from Deininger and Squire (1996). This series is identical to that reported
in Goodman and Webb (1994) and Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), and
is one of the several series reported in Brandolini (1998) and Atkinson and
Brandolini (2001). We also show a more recent series, Gini (b). (A range of
Gini coeﬃcients for the United Kingdom is given by Brandolini (1998). Al-
though the series diﬀer among themselves and with the Gini coeﬃcients
shown in ﬁgure 6.1, the pattern we are about to describe is consistent with




























































































































































































































































.the full range of data.) Income inequality in Britain changed relatively little
until the early 1970s, though there is some evidence of a narrowing of in-
equalities during the second World War. During the 1970s, income in-
equality seems to have declined, after which, from about 1978, there was a
rapid increase. By about 1985, the decline of the early 1970s had been un-
done, and the rate of growth of income inequality accelerated. Depending
on the time frame, it is therefore possible to date the beginning of the in-
crease from either the late 1970s or the mid-1980s. By 1990, the increase ap-
pears to have stopped, and income inequality did not increase during the
1990s, remaining at the high level established by 1990.
Given the lack of movement in income inequality in Britain until the
1970s, we can safely suppose that median incomes tracked mean incomes
before the early 1970s. We can therefore conclude from the top left panel
that median real income growth was somewhat faster after the early 1970s
than before it. As we shall see, this is in sharp contrast to what happened in
the United States, and this lack of any slowdown in British income growth
will play an important role in our interpretation of the mortality data.
The right-hand panels of ﬁgure 6.1 show the income and income in-
equality data for the United States. On the top panel we present the U.S.
Census Bureau’s estimate of real median family income, in 1999 dollars.
The Census Bureau also publishes oﬃcial estimates of the Gini coeﬃcient
based on (partly unpublished) survey data from the Current Population
Survey (CPS). These numbers, for both families and households (which
can contain unrelated individuals), are shown in the lower left-hand panel.
Both series have discontinuities between 1992 and 1993. The Census Bu-
reau changed its questionnaires between those years, allowing a higher top
value of income to be reported, and is unable to estimate how much of the
change between 1992 and 1993 is real (see Jones and Weinberg 2000).
The experience of income inequality in the United States is remarkably
similar to that in the United Kingdom. Until the mid-1970s, there is little
perceptible trend, though perhaps some narrowing. After 1972, income in-
equality increases, with the rate of increase accelerating in the mid-1980s.
If we were to extrapolate across the breaks in the series, the increase goes
on into the 1990s. However, it is also possible that the two detached arms
should be lowered onto the earlier series, in which case, as in Britain, there
is little or no increase in income inequality in the 1990s. In any case, there
is no increase except across the disputed years 1992 and 1993.
Median incomes behave as the mirror image of income inequality. Prior
to 1972, there was steady growth in real family incomes, and inequality,
though varying from year to year, showed no trend. After 1972, the situa-
tion was reversed, with little growth in real median family incomes and a
rapid growth in income inequality. In the 1990s, and especially if we dis-
count the apparent increase in income inequality, the earlier pattern ap-
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equality, albeit at a higher level than in the 1950s and 1960s.
The diﬀerent patterns of income growth in the two countries and the
similar patterns of income inequality provide a useful background within
which to examine how long-term patterns of income and inequality growth
have conditioned changes in mortality.
Figure 6.2 turns to the mortality data, beginning with infant mortality
rates. Mortality data for England and Wales are available from 1851 to 1998.
Although infant mortality is not our main concern here, it is a useful
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Fig. 6.2 Infant mortality in the United Kingdom and United States
Sources: U.K. Government Actuaries Department (http://www.gad.gov.uk/b2/b2div6
.htm#life); U.K. National Statistics website (http://www.statistics.gov.uk/); Berkeley Mortal-
ity Database (http://www.demog.berkeley.edu/wilmoth/mortality/).starting point because of its place in the previous literature; because it is
likely to respond more rapidly than adult mortality to changes in the envi-
ronment, including any eﬀects of income and income inequality; and be-
cause it will illustrate several of the themes that will recur in the discussion
of mortality among adults and the elderly. In his 1996 book, Unhealthy
Societies, Richard Wilkinson implicates the rise of income inequality in
Britain in infant mortality, arguing that mortality rates fell less rapidly af-
ter 1985 than would have been the case had income inequality remained
constant. Figure 5.10 of Wilkinson (1996, 97) plots a time series of mortal-
ity, not only of infants, but also of children and young adults, and shows
that the sum of age-adjusted mortality rates fell less rapidly after 1985 than
it did in the decade from 1975 to 1985. A good deal of the eﬀect comes from
changes in infant mortality, and the top panel of ﬁgure 6.2 replicates
Wilkinson’s analysis using the log odds of mortality. We ﬁt a regression line
to the data from 1975 to 1985 and plot the predicted values together with
the full series from 1950 to 1999. After 1985, when income inequality was
increasing in earnest, the infant mortality rate was indeed above the 1975
to 1985 trend. Note, however, that 1975 to 1985 saw the most rapid de-
crease in the postwar period and that the decline was also relatively slow,
not only after 1985, but also prior to 1975, when income inequality showed
no upward trend. Note also that there has been no resumption of the more
rapid downward trend in the years after 1990 when inequality stopped in-
creasing, indeed rather the reverse. So the case against income inequality is
less than overwhelming, although it is true that the ten-year trend in infant
mortality decline in Britain was broken around 1985 at the time that in-
come inequality began to rise most rapidly.
A similar analysis for the United States is shown in the bottom panel of
ﬁgure 6.2. The graphs for the two countries show marked similarities, with
two periods of relatively slow decline bracketing a period of more rapid de-
cline. In the United States, the period of rapid decline is earlier than in the
United Kingdom and lasts rather longer; it starts about 1965 and ends
around 1980. Once again, the second period of slower decline (although
not the ﬁrst) coincides with the period of rapid inequality increase. And
once again, there is no inequality episode to match the earlier period of
slow decline, nor are there any signs of a return to more rapid progress af-
ter inequality stopped growing.
If we take the two countries together, there is no obvious link between in-
fant mortality and the long-term growth in incomes. The pre- and post-
1972 histories of real income are quite diﬀerent in the two countries, yet
their mortality experiences are similar, albeit with some diﬀerences in tim-
ing. Furthermore, the rapid mortality decline in the United States from
1965 to 1980 continued unabated, notwithstanding the halt in the growth
of real median family income after 1972. Instead, the most obvious feature
of the two graphs is their similarity, especially if the British data are
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regressed on the contemporaneous and four lagged values of the American
series, only the fourth lag is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, and it attracts
a coeﬃcient of 0.98. A regression of British infant mortality on the fourth
lag of American mortality, with a coeﬃcient of unity, cannot be rejected
against the alternative with current American mortality and all four lags.
Such evidence is suggestive, not of any simple link between mortality, in-
come, and income inequality, but rather of the importance of technologi-
cal change, with US technological innovations reaching Britain with about
a four year lag.
Figure 6.3 shows plots of the log odds of mortality for England and
Wales by ﬁve-year age groups from twenty–twenty-four to sixty-ﬁve–sixty-
nine. Females are shown on the left and males on the right, both drawn on
the same scale. The top panels are for the younger groups, from twenty to
twenty-four through to forty to forty-four, and the bottom panels for the
age groups from forty-ﬁve to forty-nine through to sixty-ﬁve to sixty-nine.
The mortality experience among those aged seventy and above is not
shown here (but see ﬁgure 6.6); its behavior over time is similar to the mor-
tality rates of those aged sixty-ﬁve to sixty-nine. It is important to look at
younger and older groups separately, and also at males and females sepa-
rately, because mortality of the four groups behaves quite diﬀerently. This
diﬀerentiation by age is also an important reason for diﬀerentiating in-
come and income inequality by age, which is one of the main motivations
for our work on cohorts in section 6.3.
Men always have higher mortality rates than women in the same age
group. This is particularly true for young men under thirty. However, the
most important diﬀerence between the younger and older groups, between
the top and bottom panels, is in the behavior of their mortality rates over
time. The younger groups, like infants in ﬁgure 6.2, have more rapid mor-
tality decline in the early years, before 1970 and much less rapid mortality
declines—and in some cases (young men and the youngest women) mor-
tality even increases—in the later years. The story is quite diﬀerent for age
groups over forty. There is a steady decline in mortality throughout the pe-
riod, and the trend accelerates after the early 1970s. The acceleration in
mortality decline is more pronounced for older and middle-aged men than
for women and more rapid among middle-aged than older women. The
transition from the “young” pattern of deceleration to the “older” pattern
of acceleration takes place gradually over age groups. In males aged from
thirty-ﬁve to forty-four, for example, we see evidence of both patterns, with
the acceleration setting in and then being reversed at the end of the period.
Whatever is the cause of these patterns, income inequality is an unlikely
candidate, unless there is some ex ante reason to suppose that the young
are more aﬀected than the middle-aged and the elderly. Otherwise, the pat-
tern of mortality and income inequality is wrong for those over forty, just






































mas it is right for the younger groups and for the infant mortality rate. Deaths
from AIDS account for almost all of the increase in mortality rates among
young men and of the elimination of mortality decline among the youngest
groups of women. It is unclear that the AIDS epidemic would have been
very diﬀerent had there been no increase in income inequality.
Figure 6.4 shows mortality rates by age for men and women in the
United States using the same format as in ﬁgure 6.3. As was the case with
the infant mortality rates, there are marked similarities between the British
and American experiences, though once again there are important diﬀer-
ences in timing. The elimination of the decline in mortality rates among
younger age groups and its subsequent reversal are more pronounced in
the American data. Rising mortality rates among the youngest groups are
more common and are apparent even in the forty–forty-four age group of
men. In the older groups, we see the same acceleration in mortality decline
as in Britain. As before, it is more pronounced among men than among
women and more apparent for middle-aged women than for those aged
over sixty.
Because the pattern of income inequality in the United States is so sim-
ilar to that in Britain, income inequality is no more likely a cause of the
American patterns than it is of the British ones. The American data also
help us cast a good deal of doubt on the hypothesis that income is the main
driving force behind mortality decline. The productivity slowdown in the
United States, and its associated decline in the rate of growth of real me-
dian incomes, is almost coincident with the acceleration in mortality de-
cline among the middle-aged and elderly. Although it is undoubtedly pos-
sible to muddy the waters by thinking about income operating at a lag,
perhaps of many years, any simple story is precluded by the fact that the
histories of income growth and mortality decline both break into two pro-
longed and sharply diﬀerent periods and that the associations over these
two periods are precisely the wrong way round.
If the mortality patterns are not driven by income and income inequal-
ity, what are their causes? There are many competing explanations. The
diﬀerences between men and women may have something to do with their
diﬀerent histories of smoking, with women taking up the habit later than
men, and with the long lags between smoking and its health consequences
in heart disease and lung cancer. There was a worldwide decrease in coro-
nary heart disease from the early 1970s, which one line of thought takes as
evidence for the (co-)involvement of an infectious agent (chlamydia pneu-
moniae). This hypothesis is controversial, with some evidence indicating it
is not correct (Wald et al. 2000; Danesh et al. 2000). The decline may in-
stead have been due to major technical improvements in the treatment of
heart disease, particularly the spread of angioplasty and of coronary by-
pass grafts as well as the increased use of drugs including aspirin and clot-
busters.





































sThe role of medical technology in mortality decline is clariﬁed by direct
comparison of the British and American experiences. These are provided
in ﬁgure 6.5 for infant mortality and for middle-aged adults and in ﬁgure
6.6for the elderly. As always, we disaggregate by sex and here show selected
ﬁve-year age groups. With the exception of 1950 and 1951 for infant mor-
tality, American mortality rates are higher than British mortality rates up
to age sixty-ﬁve. For the elderly, mortality rates are higher in the United
Kingdom. Aside from their levels, and as was the case for infant mortality,
the development of mortality rates over time is similar in the two countries,
though once again developments in the United States—particularly the ac-
celeration in mortality decline around 1970 and its more recent slowing—
appear to lead the same developments in Britain. This evidence further
serves to strengthen the supposition that variations in the rate of decline in
these mortality rates is driven, not by income or income inequality, but by
technological change, much of which is ﬁrst seen in the United States and
is subsequently transmitted to Britain. For the middle-aged groups, from
ages forty-ﬁve to sixty and for both men and women, we replicate the result
that we found for infant mortality; in a regression of British on contempo-
raneous and four lags of American mortality rates, the fourth lag has a co-
eﬃcient close to unity, while the contemporaneous and earlier lags are in-
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Although it appears to beneﬁt from technical progress ﬁrst, the United
States has higher levels of mortality than Britain. One obvious explanation
is the more or less universal access to health care in Britain in contrast to
the United States, a hypothesis that might seem to be further supported by
the cross-over after age sixty-ﬁve, at which point most Americans are cov-
ered by Medicare. According to this story, the elderly in the United States
have the best of both worlds, with both good access and superior technol-
ogy. The superior technology in the United States beneﬁts younger Amer-
icans less because of limited access. While there may be some truth in this
account, it faces two immediate problems. First, the diﬀerence between
British and American mortality rates is steadily diminishing with age. Al-
though the cross-over takes place around age sixty-ﬁve, the graphs for
those aged ﬁfty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-nine are closer than those aged forty-ﬁve to
forty-nine. Similarly, after the crossover has taken place, the gap between
elderly Americans and elderly Britons proceeds to increase with age. Al-
though exposure to better technology may plausibly have an eﬀect that cu-
mulates with age, it is hard to see why age should narrow the gap prior to
the availability of Medicare. The second problem with the access story is
that the diﬀerences between British and American mortality rates do not
seem to have changed after the introduction of Medicare in the late 1960s.
The pattern of relative mortality by age was established prior to the intro-
duction of Medicare.
























































sA more satisfactory account of relative mortality in the two countries
recognizes the beneﬁts of universal access but notes the low levels of
health-care ﬁnancing in Britain, not only relative to the United States, but
also relative to other Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD) countries; see, for example, Gerdtham and Jönsson
(2000, table 1). The consequent rationing of health care in Britain is in
many cases based on age, with the elderly (with elderly generously deﬁned)
frequently denied access to expensive technologies from which they are
likely to beneﬁt, kidney dialysis being only the clearest example; see Aaron
and Schwartz (1984). As Aaron and Schwartz also make clear, there are
great diﬀerences in the way that new technologies are introduced in the two
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Fig. 6.6 Mortality among the elderly, United Kingdom and United Statescountries. In the competitive health care industry in the United States,
there is great pressure to adopt new technologies as soon as they are fea-
sible, essentially irrespective of cost. This certainly happened with the tech-
nologies that are important for the mortality changes discussed in this pa-
per, the construction of neonatal facilities for low birth weight babies and
the adoption of angioplasty and bypass surgery. In Britain, by contrast,
with its centralized National Health Service, expensive new technologies
cannot be adopted without central government approval, which needs to
wait for demonstrated eﬀectiveness and the release of funding. Even then,
access to the technologies is restricted, especially by age. These diﬀerences
in institutional structure generate about a four-year lag between the intro-
duction of expensive new technologies in the United States and in Britain,
and this provides us with the opportunity to assess the eﬀects of these tech-
nological changes on mortality.
We should note that our analysis, although helping to explain the pat-
terns in the data, is silent on the relative merits of the two systems. Al-
though the American system generates lower mortality rates at higher ages,
the increases in life expectancy will sometimes be small and the cost very
great. The British system spends relatively little and has higher life ex-
pectancy at birth.
6.3 Age Speciﬁc Mortality, Incomes, and Income Inequality
6.3.1 Summary of Previous Work
We begin with a brief summary of the theory that motivated our earlier
empirical work in Deaton and Paxson (2001). In that paper, we examined
the extent to which income is protective against mortality and whether in-
come inequality is associated with higher mortality. Our starting point was
a simple model in which each person’s health status (h) is assumed to be a
function of his or her income (y) relative to the average income of those in
the person’s reference group (z). Assuming a linear relationship between
health and (the logarithm of) income, the expected value of health condi-
tional on y and z is
(1) E(hy, z)      (y   z).
The reference group could be deﬁned by geography or other characteris-
tics. If z is a ﬁxed number for all individuals, then (1) collapses to a model
in which health is determined solely by own-income.
Equation (1) has several implications for the relationship between
health, income, and income inequality. First, given that reference groups
are not observable, (1) is not estimable. Instead, we must work with the ex-
pectation of health conditional on own-income. Assuming that y and z are
jointly normal, this conditional expectation can be expressed as








2  (y    )      ∗(y    ),
where the marginal distribution of z is assumed to be N( ,  z
2), and the dis-
tribution of y conditional on z is N(z,  ε
2) so that  ε
2 and  z
2 are measures of
within–reference group and between–reference group inequality.
Two main conclusions are drawn from equation (2). First, if the refer-
ence group model is correct, estimates of  ∗ will diﬀer from  , with the ex-
tent of the bias a function of the relative sizes of the within- and between-
group variances. If within–reference group inequality is small, then
individual income is a poor measure of relative income, and the estimated
income gradient in health will be small. If, on the other hand, within–ref-
erence group inequality is large relative to between–reference group in-
equality—which might be the case if reference groups are deﬁned by large
geographical areas, entire birth cohorts, or by entire populations of coun-
tries—then  ∗ will be close to  .
The second conclusion is that models in which health is determined by
relative income do notnecessarily imply that inequality will be harmful to
health. In equation (2), inequality aﬀects the slope of the gradient, but
does not appear as a separate determinant of health outcomes. This result
is driven by the assumption that individuals compare themselves to the
mean income level in the reference group. If, instead, what matters is in-
come relative to income at the top of the distribution within the reference
group, a mean-preserving spread in income will harm the health of all
those with incomes below the top of the distribution. Although this as-
sumption delivers the result that inequality is harmful to health, other as-
sumptions and outcomes are possible. For example, if rank within the ref-
erence group is what matters for health, then changes in inequality will
not increase or reduce health (given income). Likewise, if what matters is
income relative to the lowest income within the reference group, then
mean-preserving spreads in income will improve the health of all but the
poorest.
In our American and British work, we estimate models that relate the
mortality experiences of birth cohorts to income and income inequality
with the cohort. Aggregation within cohorts can introduce a relationship
between mortality and inequality even if there is no relationship at the in-
dividual level. By Jensen’s inequality, if health is increasing but concave in
income (or, conversely, if the relationship between the probability of mor-
tality and income is decreasing but convex), then a mean-preserving
spread in within-cohort income will reduce average health. Aggregation to
the cohort level also has implications for the slope of the gradient. If refer-
ence groups lie “within” cohorts—so that what matters for health is own-
income relative to income of some group of individuals born in the same
year—then aggregation will annihilate the relationship between health
Mortality, Income, and Income Inequality over Time 261and income. On the other hand, if reference groups cut across cohorts, then
estimation using the aggregated data will provide information on the
gradient, although the slope of the gradient may be attenuated as in (2).
These points are discussed in more detail in Deaton and Paxson (2001).
6.3.2 Data
In the following section we extend our earlier work on mortality, income,
and income inequality from the United States to Britain, or more precisely
to England and Wales. (Britain is England and Wales plus Scotland; the
United Kingdom is Britain plus Northern Ireland.) Income measures are
drawn from the 1971 to 1998 rounds of the British Family Expenditure Sur-
vey (FES). The FES has information on households in England, Wales,
Scotland, and Northern Ireland. We excluded households from Scotland
and Northern Ireland so as to match the income to the mortality data.
As in the American work, we combine the mortality and income data to-
gether at the level of the birth cohort. We restrict our analysis to groups of
individuals aged twenty-ﬁve to eighty-ﬁve. There are approximately 11,000
observations on individuals (both men and women) in this age range in any
single survey year of the FES, and there are, on average, eighty-ﬁve obser-
vations within each cohort-age-gender cell. The FES is used to compute
averages (or medians, variances, etc.) of income and education variables
for each cohort-age-gender cell. These data are then merged with the mor-
tality data by cohort, age, and gender. When the two data sources are com-
bined, we are left with individuals born from 1886 (aged eighty-ﬁve in
1971) to 1973 (aged twenty-ﬁve in 1998). For a small number of birth co-
horts at some advanced ages, there are no individuals in the FES. Our ﬁnal
data set upon merging consists of 1,680 cohort-age cells for men and 1,706
cohort-age cells for women.
The income measure we use is normal gross weekly household income.
We adjust for household size by dividing income by the number of “adult
equivalents” in the household, where children under the age of eighteen
count as one-half an adult. In most of our analyses we use the average of
the logarithm of income per adult equivalent as our measure of the income
level. For measures of dispersion we use the Gini coeﬃcient and the vari-
ance of the logarithm of income per adult equivalent. The education vari-
ables we use require discussion. From 1978, the FES has information on
the age at which the individual left full-time schooling. We convert this to
years of schooling by assuming that education starts at age ﬁve. There were
a small number of cases of individuals who reporting ﬁnished full-time
schooling after the age of twenty-ﬁve (with one seventy-two-year-old re-
porting that full-time schooling did not end until age ﬁfty-two). In these
cases we restricted our measure of years of schooling to twenty. Because in-
formation on education was not available prior to 1978, our sample period
is 1978–1998 when we use information on education.
The FES also contains some information on tobacco use, which is an im-
262 Angus Deaton and Christina Paxsonportant determinant of health. The FES does not directly ask respondents
if they currently smoke nor does it collect any information on smoking his-
tory. However, it does collect individual-level data on tobacco purchases
during the reference period. We construct an indicator for smoking that is
set to one if the individual purchased any tobacco. This smoking measure
is far from perfect. Individuals may purchase tobacco for others or have it
purchased for them. In addition, there is evidence that tobacco purchases
in the FES are underreported (Goodman and Webb 1999). Finally, previ-
ous as well as current tobacco use may aﬀect mortality. These factors are
likely to attenuate our estimates of the relationship between tobacco and
mortality. Nevertheless, when looking at the inﬂuence of income on mor-
tality, it is useful to be able to control for tobacco use, albeit imperfectly.
In many of the results that follow, we contrast British results with results
from the United States, drawn from Deaton and Paxson (2001). The U.S.
data are constructed in the same way as the British data. The mortality data
are from the Berkeley mortality data base, and the income information is
calculated from the 1976–1996 waves of the March CPS. The variable def-
initions are similar, with a few small exceptions. One is that income is
annual before–tax household income, rather than normal gross weekly
household income. Another is that schooling is based on questions about
the grade level attained rather than the age at which schooling was com-
pleted. Further details on the data are in Deaton and Paxson (2001).
6.3.3 An Empirical Formulation
There are several possible ways of using age and year data to examine the
eﬀects of income and income inequality on mortality. An important re-
quirement for a suitable empirical model is that age and time trends be ﬂex-
ibly incorporated so that their eﬀects are not inappropriately projected
onto the income variables. Beyond age twenty or so, mortality increases
monotonically with age. Income inequality also increases with age, and in-
come has the characteristic life-cycle pattern of increase and decline. If age-
speciﬁc mortality is not ﬂexibly modeled, there is a danger that we ascribe
some of the eﬀects of age to income or income inequality. Similar argu-
ments apply to time trends. Mortality has a background underlying down-
ward trend, and it makes little sense to spuriously match this to the trends
in income and income inequality.
To avoid these diﬃculties, we start from the speciﬁcation
(3) ln o at    0    1t    a    at   εat,
where ln oat is the log odds of mortality for the group aged a and observed
in year t.  0and  1are parameters; tis a time trend;  ais an unrestricted set
of age dummies, one for each year of age; and εat is a residual. The term  at
needs to be further speciﬁed in order to give the model content. One possi-
bility would be a cohort model in which  at    t–a and thus varies only by
year of birth; versions of this model were explored in Deaton and Paxson
Mortality, Income, and Income Inequality over Time 263(2001). Alternatively, we can use  at as a vehicle for the economic variables.
For example, one model that we explore is where  at is a linear function of
(for example) mean family income and mean years of education for people
aged a in year t, and of income inequality within the age group in that year
so that
(4)  at    1y   at    2s   at    3giniat.
We shall also estimate such models separately for diﬀerent age groups,
which eﬀectively allows the coeﬃcients in equations (3) and (4) to be func-
tions of age. Such a speciﬁcation is very close to the leading statistical
model of mortality in the demographic literature of Lee and Carter (1992).
Their model is for the logarithm of the mortality rate itself, rather than the
log odds, but the two measures are close when the probability of death is
small, and they write
(5) ln p at    ˜a    ˜
akt   uat,
where   ˜ a and   ˜
a are unrestricted age coeﬃcients, and kt is a random walk
with (downward) drift so that with innovation vt
(6) kt   kt 1    ˜
1   vt.
In their estimations, the random walk with drift is very close to a time trend
so that equation (5) is in practice very close to equation (3) with age-
speciﬁc coeﬃcients on the time trend and  at omitted.
Although models such as equations (1) and (5) ﬁt the data well, they have
a number of deﬁciencies for our purposes and, indeed, more generally. Be-
cause all age-speciﬁc mortality rates are assumed to share the same trend,
either a simple linear trend in equation (1) or a random trend in equation
(5), these models cannot recognize episodes in which age-speciﬁc mortal-
ity rates deviate for a substantial period from their long-run trends. In our
current data, this is a problem for the younger adult groups whose long-
term mortality decline has been interrupted in recent years by mortality re-
lated to AIDS (see ﬁgures 6.3 and 6.5). As a result, we run some risk of spu-
riously attributing the spread of an infectious disease to any economic
events that happen to coincide with it; again, see the discussion in section
6.2. More generally, equations (3) and (4) allow economic variables to play
a role only once unrestricted age eﬀects and time trends have been elimi-
nated. But as Lee and Carter’s work (1992) makes clear, these variables by
themselves give a good account of the data so that, given our concern not
to impute too much to economic variables, the speciﬁcation may allow
them too little information to work with. While recognizing the problem,
we currently see no way of dealing with it.
Figure 6.7 shows long-term information on cohort mortality in the
United Kingdom and United States and highlights some of the diﬃculties
of modeling the time-series properties of mortality. The graph shows the








































































slog odds of mortality for every twentieth cohort, starting with those born
in 1870 and ending with those born in 1970. The U.K. and U.S. patterns
share many of the same features. The log odds of mortality decline sharply
after infancy, and after age thirty increase roughly linearly with age. Al-
though there were mortality declines at all ages for both sexes over this pe-
riod, the patterns diﬀer across age groups. The declines were particularly
rapid for women of child-bearing age in the early part of the twentieth cen-
tury. In addition, mortality declines at older ages are more pronounced for
women than for men. The mortality experience of both countries shows ev-
idence of the inﬂuenza pandemic of 1919 (and, for British males, deaths
associated with the ﬁrst World War). Finally, in both countries there is a
marked slowing of mortality decline among young men born in the latter
half of the twentieth century. In many of the results that follow, we omit the
youngest groups of men (aged twenty-ﬁve to thirty-four) so that the slow-
down in mortality decline due to HIV/AIDS does not aﬀect the analysis.
6.3.4 Income, Income Inequality, and Mortality
We start by examining the relationship between mortality and the level
of income. Table 6.1 contains the ﬁrst set of regression results using the
speciﬁcation shown in equation (3), in which we assume that  at is a linear
function of the average of the logarithm of income per adult equivalent.
The regressions are estimated separately for men and women, for the full
sample of twenty-ﬁve–eighty-ﬁve-year-olds, and for four smaller age
ranges. We report only the estimates of the coeﬃcient on income. The ﬁrst
three columns of estimates and t-values are for the United States, with and
without the time trend, and in the third column, with an interaction of the
time trend with age. This last speciﬁcation is similar to Lee and Carter’s
(1992) formulation in that it allows the eﬀects of a common trend to vary
across ages. The last three columns repeat these equations for Britain.
When time trends are excluded from the regressions, the estimates are
closely comparable for the United States and Britain. For all age groups
combined, the logarithm of income per equivalent is protective against
mortality, with a coeﬃcient of –0.56 (men) and –0.53 (women) in the
United States and –0.64 (men) and –0.77 (women) in the United Kingdom.
Apart from the twenty-ﬁve–thirty-nine-year-old group of males in the
United States, whose mortality rates have been increasing in recent years
(again, see ﬁgure 6.4) and whose mortality rate is estimated to respond pos-
itively to increases in income, the age group estimates are also similar across
the two countries. In both cases, income is most strongly protective in
middle-age. As we showed in Deaton and Paxson (2001), these protective
eﬀects of income are close to those estimated from the individual-level data
from the National Longitudinal Mortality Study in the United States. We
also argued, based on the model of reference groups, that this correspon-
dence of the two sets of estimates was to be expected if, as seems likely, ref-
erence groups cut across cohorts rather than being conﬁned within them.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.The inclusion of time trends upsets this conformity of results across
countries and data sets. (Similar results are obtained when a complete set
of year dummies are included instead of a time trend.) In the United States,
when all ages are pooled, the time trend reduces the estimated eﬀect of log
income but does not eliminate it. However, including the time trend does
change the sign of the income coeﬃcient for the older age groups. Results
in Deaton and Paxson (2001) indicate that when a time trend is included
but income is instrumented with a set of cohort dummies and with a mea-
sure of schooling, the eﬀect of income is similar to that originally estimated
with no trend. It is questionable whether the cohort dummies and years of
schooling are valid instruments for income in a mortality regression.
Schooling, in particular, may have independent eﬀects on health. However,
the fact that the use of these instruments yielded sensible results that lined
up with those found in microdata (from the National Longitudinal Study)
provided some ex post justiﬁcation for their use.
The results for the United Kingdom with the trend included are quite
diﬀerent from results with no trend included and from the U.S. results. In
Britain, the inclusion of a time trend essentially eliminates any estimated
role for income, a result which will not be reversed in any of the other spec-
iﬁcations we report in the following. Indeed, in most cases (men of all age
groups and both men and women aged ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-nine) higher co-
hort income appears to be associated with higher mortality rates. The ad-
dition of the interaction term between the trend and age has some eﬀect on
these results—speciﬁcally, the positive and signiﬁcant association between
mortality and income for those aged ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-nine disappears.
However, in no case is income estimated to be signiﬁcantly protective. Fi-
nally, using the British data, the instrumentation strategy described previ-
ously did not restore the protective eﬀect of income.
Figures 6.8 and 6.9 explore why the results are so diﬀerent in the two
countries. The starting point for these graphs are two matching regres-
sions, one of the log odds of mortality on a set of age dummies and a time
trend and another of the logarithm of income per adult equivalent on the
same variables. The residuals of these regressions are averaged (by year in
ﬁgure 6.8 and by birth year in ﬁgure 6.9) and then plotted against one an-
other so that we can see how the behavior of the mortality rates matches
the behavior of log income, once allowance has been made for age eﬀects
and time trends in both. Both ﬁgures show plots for males on the left and
for females on the right, with Britain on the top and the United States on
the bottom. In ﬁgure 6.8 the residuals are plotted against time so that the
graphs show the average residuals over all cohorts in each year of the log
odds of mortality and the logarithm of income. In ﬁgure 6.9, the plot is
against year of birth so that the averaging is over all years for each cohort.
Figure 6.8 indicates that the year-averaged mortality and income resid-
uals are not negatively related for either country. Regressions of one on the


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































.other yield coeﬃcients for income that are small—sometimes positive and
sometimes negative—and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent zero for males and fe-
males in both countries. The cohort-averaged residuals in ﬁgure 6.9 have
diﬀerent patterns. For the United States, there is a negative relationship be-
tween the income and mortality residuals. The coeﬃcient on income from
a regression is –0.54 (t   4.6) for males and –0.45 (t   6.2) for females. For
the U.K. these coeﬃcients are –0.05 (t 0.18) for males and –0.15 (t .89)
for females. Note, however, that these results hinge on the experience of co-
horts born after 1930. For those born earlier (many of whom were retired
by the start of our sample period) there is no apparent relationship be-
tween income and mortality in either country.
We do not have an explanation for the diﬀerences in results across Britain
and the United States. It is especially diﬃcult to piece together a story that
reconciles these diﬀerences and is also consistent with existing evidence
from micro-level data for both countries. For example, one possible expla-
nation of the cohort-level results shown here is that the relationships be-
tween income and health in the United States and Britain are genuinely
diﬀerent from each other. The provision of national health care may break
the link between health and income in Britain so that income is important
in the United States but not in Britain. Although plausible, this explanation
is at odds with micro-level evidence from the Whitehall studies (Marmot
1994) that show a strong positive relationship between socioeconomic sta-
tus and health. The Whitehall results typically use occupation or education
rather than income as an indicator of socioeconomic status. However, edu-
cation and occupation are highly correlated with income, and because we
do not control for education or occupation in table 6.1, we would expect in-
come to capture the general eﬀects of socioeconomic status.
Another possible explanation is that our earlier conclusions about the
United States were wrong and that income is not important for health in
either country. The results in table 6.1 do not provide very strong evidence
that income aﬀects mortality in either country, at least when the time trend
is included. In Deaton and Paxson (2001), the U.S. results with a trend were
consistent with the micro evidence only after applying a set of instruments
of questionable validity. And the relationships between income and mor-
tality found in the microdata could be due to the eﬀect of health on income
so that individuals in poorer health both earn less and are more likely to
die. However, it is diﬃcult to dismiss the micro evidence so easily. For ex-
ample, Case, Lubotsky, and Paxson (2002) indicate that the income gradi-
ent in health begins early in childhood, a time period during which simple
stories in which health drives income are not plausible.
It may be more sensible to focus on the relationship between mortality
and education rather than income. Education is a better measure of long-
run resources than current income, and it may be that it is long-run rather
than current incomes that matter for health. Education may also aﬀect
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information. Our earlier work from the United States indicates that con-
trolling for education eliminates the protective eﬀect of income when using
the cohort-aggregated data (although not when using the microdata from
the National Longitudinal Mortality Study). Evidence from Deaton and
Lubotsky (2003) using U.S. city-level data indicates that the association be-
tween income and mortality vanishes once controls for education are in-
troduced.
Table 6.2 shows regressions of the log odds of mortality on both income
and mean years of schooling. Age dummies and a time trend are included
in each regression. The ﬁrst column shows U.S. results. As in Deaton and
Paxson (2001), schooling has a large, negative, and signiﬁcant association
with mortality. When education is included, income appears to be haz-
ardous for males, possibly reﬂecting the countercyclical pattern in mortal-
ity discussed by Ruhm (2000). Income is either hazardous or insigniﬁcant
for females. The British results show a very similar pattern. However, the
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Table 6.2 Log Odds of Dying as a Function of Income, Education, and Smoking
United States  United Kingdom  United States  United Kingdom 
(all males) (all males) (all females) (all females)
Mean ln(y/ae) 0.093 0.057 0.071 –0.012 0.013 0.019
(2.91) (2.36) (2.97) (0.47) (0.67) (0.98)
Mean years of  –0.115 –0.020 –0.018 –0.065 –0.022 –0.017
schooling (22.0) (3.07) (2.74) (10.6) (4.08) (3.05)
Fraction 0.203 0.154
smokers (5.55) (4.92)
Males Aged 35–59 Females Aged 35–59
Mean ln(y/ae) 0.201 0.070 0.079 0.001 –0.022 –0.015
(3.49) (1.83) (2.03) (0.02) (0.71) (.049)
Mean years of  –0.260 –0.029 –0.027 –0.191 0.008 0.012
schooling (21.0) (2.54) (2.35) (13.92) (0.86) (1.26)
Fraction 0.135 0.146
smokers (2.06) (2.86)
Males Aged 60–85 Females Aged 60–85
Mean ln(y/ae) 0.095 0.035 0.034 0.121 0.043 0.052
(5.00) (2.46) (2.37) (7.19) (2.28) (2.81)
Mean years of  0.002 –0.018 –0.018 –0.022 –0.031 –0.030
schooling (0.52) (4.51) (4.55) (4.84) (5.98) (5.95)
Fraction –0.013 0.128
smokers (0.65) (4.68)
Notes: T-statistics in parentheses. Each regression includes a set of age dummies and a time trend. The
regressions are estimated for the full sample, and for subsets of cohorts in diﬀerent age groups. The data
for the United States are for 1975–1995, and for the United Kingdom are for 1978–1998.eﬀects of both income and education are much smaller than in the United
States. For example, a one-year increase in education is predicted to reduce
the odds of mortality for all males by 11.5 percent in the United States and
only 2.0 percent in the United Kingdom. These results could be due to gen-
uine diﬀerences in the provision of health care between Britain and the
United States. However, they are also consistent with the hypothesis that it
is neither education nor income that matters, but some third factor that is
less correlated with education in Britain, where the variation in education
is much less. More work using micro-level data is required before drawing
this conclusion.
The third column adds a control for the fraction of the individuals in the
cohort that reports purchases of tobacco. These regressions can only be
run for Britain, not for the United States. We include tobacco not only be-
cause it is likely to be associated with mortality, but also because its use
may be correlated with income and education, and it is useful to see
whether its inclusion aﬀects the results. As expected, mortality is usually
higher in cohorts where the fraction of smokers is high. One exception is
among men aged from sixty to eighty-ﬁve where smoking has no eﬀect on
mortality; perhaps those at risk have already been selected out by this age.
However, the treatment of tobacco does not change the behavior of the es-
timates of income or education. As before, income is estimated to be either
insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero or hazardous, and education is generally
protective.
In table 6.3 we turn to the role of inequality, measured by the Gini co-
eﬃcient for incomes within the cohort. We also look at the fraction of the
cohort that is unemployed, following the literature that argues that unem-
ployment raises the risk of death. As is the case for inequality in the United
States, the estimated eﬀects of inequality on mortality are perverse. Higher
income inequality in both countries is associated with lower mortality,
though note that the eﬀect is only signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for
younger and older men in the United States. Adding years of schooling and
smoking does not aﬀect this conclusion, nor does adding the unemploy-
ment rate. There is no clear pattern in the association between the fraction
unemployed and mortality. Unemployment is estimated to be protective of
health for all women and hazardous to health only for the group of older
men, most of whom are retired. Unemployment has no eﬀect on mortality
for the younger working-aged groups for whom the eﬀects might be ex-
pected to be the largest.
Taken together, the results for Britain are not supportive of the idea that
either income or income inequality aﬀect mortality. The only consistent
patterns we ﬁnd are that education is (mildly) protective and that smoking
is a health hazard. Part of the reason for these ﬁndings may simply be that
we are asking too much of the data. Including the time trend may be re-
moving most of the variation in the data in which we are most interested,
Mortality, Income, and Income Inequality over Time 273making it possible to identify the eﬀects of income. However, excluding the
trend is not a sensible option because secular changes in mortality are
likely to load onto trends in income or income inequality.
6.3.5 Pooling Data from Britain and the United States
All of the results so far analyze the United States and Britain separately.
In this ﬁnal subsection, we ask whether anything can be learned by pool-
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Table 6.3 Log Odds of Dying as a Function of Income, Education, and Smoking
United States  United Kingdom United States  United Kingdom
(all males) (all males) (all females) (all females)
Mean ln(y/ae)– 0.279 0.040 0.069 0.086 –0.125 0.004 0.025 0.016
(8.74) (1.65) (2.81) (2.99) (5.39) (0.21) (1.23) (0.69)
gini ln(y/ae)– 0.159 –0.020 0.028 0.026 –0.116 –0.078 –0.053 –0.017
(1.64) (0.40) (0.57) (0.45) (1.54) (2.08) (1.40) (0.36)
Mean years of  –0.019 –0.020 –0.015 –0.021
schooling (2.80) (2.67) (2.72) (3.22)
Fraction 0.204 0.250 0.154 0.147
smokers (5.57) (5.92) (4.94) (4.11)
Fraction 0.047 –0.086
unemployed (0.75) (2.11)
Males Aged 35–59 Females Aged 35–59
Mean ln(y/ae)– 0.435 0.051 0.078 0.069 –0.255 –0.016 –0.015 –0.022
(6.49) (1.33) (2.02) (1.63) (5.93) (0.54) (0.48) (0.71)
gini(y/ae)– 1.367 –0.022 0.011 0.026 –0.234 0.001 –0.007 0.006
(5.92) (0.24) (0.13) (0.28) (1.46) (0.02) (0.011) (0.08)
Mean years of  –0.027 –0.028 0.012 0.012
schooling (2.34) (2.39) (1.26) (1.16)
Fraction 0.135 0.136 0.146 0.148
smokers (2.06) (2.07) (2.85) (2.90)
Fraction –0.057 –0.101
unemployed (0.55) (1.16)
Males Aged 60–85 Females Aged 60–85
Mean ln(y/ae) 0.115 0.015 0.033 0.078 0.102 0.008 0.053 0.055
(6.33) (1.02) (2.13) (4.35) (6.04) (0.41) (2.67) (2.11)
gini (y/ae)– 0.175 –0.016 0.009 0.015 –0.032 –0.010 –0.006 0.093
(3.80) (0.59) (0.33) (0.47) (0.66) (0.30) (0.19) (2.26)
Mean years of  –0.018 –0.027 –0.030 –0.055
schooling (4.52) (5.71) (5.91) (8.80)
Fraction –0.013 –0.018 0.128 0.118
smokers (0.63) (0.76) (4.67) (3.64)
Fraction 0.083 –0.021
unemployed (2.55) (0.80)
Notes: T-statistics in parentheses. Each regression includes a set of age dummies and a time trend. The
regressions are estimated for the full sample, and for subsets of cohorts in diﬀerent age groups. The data
for the United States are for 1975–1995, and for the United Kingdom are for 1978–1998.ing the data and exploiting diﬀerences in income and mortality between
the United States and Britain. Pooling the data may, in theory, solve the
problem of identiﬁcation in the presence of trends. Under the (strong) as-
sumption that the two countries share the same technologically-driven
trends in mortality, it is possible to identify the eﬀects of income by exam-
ining how changes in the relative incomes of same-aged individuals in the
two countries are related to relative diﬀerences in mortality.
Table 6.4 shows estimates of models of the following form:







where ln o cat is the log odds of mortality for those in country c at age a and
year t, the ﬁrst three terms on the right-hand side are country, year, and age-
ﬁxed eﬀects, and ln (y/ae)catis the logarithm of income per adult equivalent.
This equation is estimated separately for men and women. The sample is re-
stricted to the years 1975–1995 so that both countries are represented in all
years. We report results with all ages pooled, although the results are simi-
lar when we break the sample into older and younger age groups.
The ﬁrst four columns of table 6.4 show estimates that are not pooled
and replicate the basic ﬁndings discussed previously. (Diﬀerences from
previous results reﬂect the diﬀerent sample period for Britain and the use
of a complete set of year dummies rather than a time trend.) In the ﬁrst two
columns, we estimate the model separately for each country, with no year
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Table 6.4 Pooled U.S. and U.K. Regressions, Log Odds of Mortality (1975–1995)
United United United United Pooled U.S. and
States Kingdom States Kingdom U.K. Regressions
Males
ln(y/ae)– 0.559 –0.462 –0.375 0.099 –0.874 –0.885
(24.2) (16.7) (11.0) (3.9) (27.0) (20.5)
Females
ln(y/ae)– 0.528 –0.602 –0.186 0.028 –0.813 –0.636
(27.4) (20.0) (7.7) (1.2) (32.7) (20.6)
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No No Yes Yes No Yes
U.K. dummy No No No No Yes Yes
F-tests on Restrictions of Equality of Coeﬃcients Across Countries in Pooled Regression
Men
Age eﬀects for United Kingdom   Age eﬀects for United States – F(60,2379) 161.84
Year eﬀects for United Kingdom   Year eﬀects for United States – F(20,2379) 22.51
Women
Age eﬀects for United Kingdom   Age eﬀects for United States – F(60,2397) 138.33
Year eﬀects for United Kingdom   Year eﬀects for United States – F(20,2397) 33.23
Note: T-statistics in parentheses. Each cell shows a coeﬃcient for ln(y/ae) from a single re-
gression.dummies. As before, income is protective in both countries for both men
and women. The American and British results are remarkably similar. The
second two columns add year dummies. In line with all of our results so far,
this has the eﬀect of reducing but not eliminating the estimated gradient for
the United States, but reversing the sign of the income to health gradient
for Britain.
In the ﬁnal two columns we present pooled results. With no year eﬀects,
we obtain the usual large negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for income:
–0.89 for men and –0.64 for women. Adding year eﬀects does not alter this
result: The coeﬃcient on income for males is essentially unchanged and
that for females declines by less than one-quarter.
Figure 6.10 presents the data in way that elucidates these results. We
computed the diﬀerence in the log odds of mortality between Britain and
the United States for each age-cohort cell and also the diﬀerences in the
logarithm of income within each age-cohort cell; the currencies were con-
verted to common units using PPP exchange rates. The top two panels av-
erage these diﬀerences by year (males are on the left and females are on the
right). The bottom two panels average these diﬀerences by year of birth.
The birth-year averaged ﬁgures are especially illuminating. For males and
females, the diﬀerence between British and American mortality declines
steadily over time so that more-recently-born British cohorts have lower
mortality relative to their American counterparts than do cohorts born
earlier in the twentieth century. Similarly, although British incomes are al-
ways below American incomes, the relative diﬀerence has declined so that
the most recently-born cohorts of British males have incomes that are sim-
ilar to their counterparts in the United States. The opposite slopes of these
two curves account for the large negative relationship between mortality
and income in the pooled regressions. The picture is much the same for fe-
males, although for this group there is an initial decline in relative British
incomes between those born in 1890 and those born around 1910. (This de-
cline also appears for men but is more muted.) The negative relationship is
less apparent in the top year-average ﬁgures in which the income diﬀer-
ences are dominated by the sharp British recession in the early 1990s.
Although these results indicate that there is a negative association be-
tween income and mortality, there are reasons to treat them with some
skepticism. First, they are based on the assumption that health technology
is identical in the two countries: In the regression results and (implicitly) in
the graphs we are assuming that year and age eﬀects are identical across the
two countries. In fact they are not. The bottom panel of table 6.4 presents
F-tests for the equality of the age and year eﬀects in the pooled model. The
hypothesis that the age eﬀects are identical is strongly rejected for both
men and women. Consistent with the time-series results discussed in sec-
tion 6.2, the unrestricted age eﬀects indicate that mortality increases faster
with age in Britain than in the United States for both men and women



























































































































































































.(although somewhat more so for men). It is also invalid to restrict the year
eﬀects to be the same across the two countries—which is not surprising,
given our results in ﬁgures 6.2 and 6.3 that suggest that British technology
lags that of the United States. The unrestricted year eﬀects show mortality
declines over the period that are somewhat larger in Britain than the
United States.
6.4 Conclusions
In both Britain and America, for men and for women and for most age
groups, there has been a very substantial decline in mortality rates since
1950. Our examination of these rates, by sex and age group and in relation
to the evolution of incomes and income inequality, does not suggest any
simple relationship between income growth and the decline in mortality,
nor between income inequality and mortality rates. In the United States,
the period of slowest income growth saw substantial accelerations in the
rate mortality decline, particularly among middle-aged and older men and
women. In both the United States and Britain, the increase in income in-
equality took place at the same time as a deceleration in mortality decline
at the younger ages, including infant mortality. But there are previously
slow rates of decline when nothing was happening to income inequality,
and the later rise in income inequality was associated with the acceleration
in mortality decline among middle-aged and older adults in both countries.
A more plausible account of the data is that over time declines in mortal-
ity are driven by technological advances or by the emergence of new infec-
tious diseases, such as AIDS. These advances and retreats are associated
with speciﬁc conditions and speciﬁc treatments, and so aﬀect men and
women diﬀerently and diﬀerent age groups diﬀerently. They also happen
ﬁrst in the United States, with the British experience following with a lag
of several years. Clearly this hypothesis needs a great deal more investiga-
tion, for example, by looking at more countries.
If changes in mortality over time are driven by technology and not by in-
come, there must be some doubt as to whether our previous analysis in
Deaton and Paxson (2001) came to the correct conclusions about the role
of cohort incomes in the decline of cohort mortality. Certainly, our results
cannot be replicated on the British data. Simple regressions of the log odds
of mortality on log income per equivalent and on age dummies give simi-
lar results in both countries, with income estimated to be strongly protec-
tive, but the addition of time trends destroys the result in the Britain, al-
though not in the United States. Education reduces mortality among
British cohorts, and smoking increases it. But neither these sensible results,
nor the inclusion of other variables, repairs our inability to produce coher-
ent and stable eﬀects of income on mortality at the cohort level. We sus-
pect—but have been unable to demonstrate decisively—that the cohort
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sumption that age eﬀects in mortality are constant through time. This is
contradicted, for example, by the spread of AIDS that has almost certainly
raised the early life relative to later life mortality rates among recently born
men and women compared with their seniors. If this is a serious problem,
the cohort method may not be useful in this context, or at least it will re-
quire substantial modiﬁcation in order to give sound results.
More substantively, we suspect that our time-series results in section 6.2
are more reliable and that this comparative international work is a pro-
ductive direction for future research. Even so, there remains a major puzzle
about the role of income. Income growth seems to play little role in the de-
cline of mortality at the national level. At the cohort level, the same is pos-
sibly true, as argued previously. Yet in the individual-level data from the
National Longitudinal Mortality Study, as from many other data sets, in-
come is protective against mortality, even when education and other so-
cioeconomic variables are controlled. Why there should be such a contrast
between the individual and national eﬀects of income is a topic that re-
quires a good deal of further thought and analysis.
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Comment James Banks
This paper adds to the large and growing body of evidence on the relation-
ship between socioeconomic status (SES) and health, or in this case mor-
tality, outcomes. The key innovation here is the detailed comparison of
identical research questions, speciﬁed in the same way in both the United
States and the United Kingdom using directly comparable data and
methodology. The exploiting of comparative microdata in a genuinely in-
tegrated manner is beginning to be a fruitful avenue for research, and the
analysis in this paper is a further example of potential gains from this type
of research. The authors’ conclusions provide a strong case for more of
such work to be undertaken, addressing not only this particular research
question (where the gains would seem to be unquestionable) but also the is-
sue more widely.
The United States and United Kingdom are natural starting points for a
comparative evaluation of the links between SES and health because a
good fraction of what is known, either in the health economics or epi-
demiological literature, has been established in these two countries. Two
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rector of the Institute for Fiscal Studies where he also directs the Centre for Economic Re-
search on Ageing.relevant background studies in this respect (as they can be directly com-
pared) are those of Hurd, McFadden, and Merrill (2000) and Attanasio
and Emmerson (2003) who investigate links between SES and mortality us-
ing comparable data on comparable cohorts, taken from the Asset and
Health Dynamics among the oldest old survey (AHEAD) and the U.K.
Retirement Survey, respectively. The former ﬁnd that wealth and income
(rankings) are correlated with mortality outcomes, as expected, but that
the relationship does not hold when controlling for subjective mortality
probabilities and initial health. The latter study shows that wealth ranking
aﬀects mortality outcomes in the United Kingdom, even controlling for
initial health status, although in this instance the authors do not have the
option of including subjective measures. In this paper Deaton and Paxson
show that when turning to data on all cohorts at all ages over a number of
years the relationship between income and mortality in the United King-
dom disappears when put under detailed scrutiny. This in turn is argued to
be suﬃcient to cast doubt on the ﬁndings (presented both here and in their
previous paper) for the United States over the same period. There is cer-
tainly something to this argument, and it is hard to disagree with the au-
thors’ resulting assessment of the drawbacks of the cohort methodology
employed in the paper. Some of these issues will be touched on in what fol-
lows, but I will also point out a number of places where it is clear that more
needs to be known before one can really evaluate the hypothesis that SES
and, in particular, inequalities in SES maybe associated with diﬀerences in
health outcomes.
The U.S.-U.K. Comparison
The comparative analysis in section 6.2 of the paper throws up both sim-
ilarities and diﬀerences between the time path of income, income inequal-
ity, and (age-speciﬁc) mortality rates in the two countries that lie at the crux
of the issue. On the economic side, trends in income inequality are argued
to be similar, although trends in incomes are shown to be quite diﬀerent,
particularly at and below the median. With respect to mortality, trends in
infant mortality are remarkably similar, even though the U.S. time-series
appears to lead the United Kingdom by a couple of years,1 and trends in
adult age-speciﬁc mortality rates appear similar. Here it may be worth
pointing out two points where one could take an alternative interpretation
of the authors’ ﬁgures.
With respect to income inequality, while it is certainly true that inequal-
ity in the United States and the United Kingdom broadly speaking fol-
lowed the same trends—being ﬂat until the late 1970s and then rising be-
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1. The authors’ point about possible technology lags between the two countries is an im-
portant and potentially attractive explanation that demands a more detailed investigation.fore ﬂattening out in the 1990s—the magnitude and speed of these changes
was very diﬀerent across the two countries. Inequality, as measured by the
Gini coeﬃcient, was considerably higher in the United States than in the
United Kingdom throughout the sample period, and the time path is strik-
ingly diﬀerent. The degree of inequality rose by almost 10 percentage
points (40 percent) through the 1980s in the United Kingdom, during
which time U.S. inequality rose by 3 to 4 percentage points (less than 10
percent). Of course there are measurement and comparability issues here,
but the possible consequences of such extreme and rapid change in the
United Kingdom, as opposed to the more gradual change experienced in
the United States, could be interesting to explore, particularly given the na-
ture of transmission mechanisms typically talked about for the inequality–
health relationship (see Marmot and Wilkinson 1999, for example).
There are also a set of diﬀerences between the time paths of age-speciﬁc
mortality rates in the two countries that could be important. It is certainly
true that mortality rates for the old show very similar time paths across the
two countries. For younger adults, however, this is less the case, to my eye
at least, with quite diﬀerent trends and patterns for males and females be-
tween ages twenty and forty over the whole sample, but particularly in the
period from the late 1980s onward.
Methodology
The use of data on all cohorts at all ages adds substantially to the anal-
ysis and allows the authors to examine grander research questions than a
single cohort or cross-sectional study. But the drawback, as is well known,
is that identifying assumptions need to be made to separate out the eﬀects
of interest, whether these be age, cohort, or time. As is pointed out in the
paper, age proﬁles (for income and mortality) are assumed to be the same
for all cohorts, and Deaton and Paxson discuss the fact that it could be the
violation of this assumption that lies behind the breakdown of the SES–
health relationship at the cohort level. This assessment seems sensible on
two grounds. Firstly, the assumption implies that advances in medical tech-
nology beneﬁt all age groups (relatively) equally, such that they can be cap-
tured in a trend eﬀect leaving the age proﬁle unaﬀected. Second, and highly
related, the implication is that health technology eﬀects (or for that matter
other changes, including income and income and income inequality) must
operate contemporaneously. For example, were some health event or tech-
nology to change mortality rates at one particular age then that cohort’s
mortality experiences will likely diﬀer at later ages, either as a result of dy-
namic eﬀects of the event itself or as a result of selection, thus changing the
age relativities for the cohort in comparison to its predecessors.
For this reason, and with respect to this particular international com-
parison, the role of the “access to health services” story may be hard to
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tries discussed previously. Even those aged ﬁfty at the end of the sample pe-
riod will have been born in the late 1940s. Yet the biggest innovation in
U.K. healthcare—the National Health Service (NHS), discussed at a num-
ber of points in the paper—was only introduced in 1948. One possibility is
that the NHS, through changing the nature and distribution of health in-
terventions in early life, will have led to changes in later life that will only
show up as international diﬀerences in those cohorts born after its intro-
duction. Similar arguments could apply in reverse to more recent years,
when the United Kingdom has not had the expansion in (aggregate) health
care spending of the United States.2
Even with a less restrictive framework for cohort-age proﬁles, the inter-
national comparison in this paper also points to a methodological issue
about the role and nature of inequality itself that could maybe be taken fur-
ther. There is some discussion in this paper, but particularly elsewhere, of
mechanisms that might underlie links between inequalities in SES and
health, often relating to psychosocial factors, such as stress, control, and
so on. It is quite possible, however, that such underlying psychosocial fac-
tors are changing diﬀerentially across the two countries, or at least are be-
ing picked up diﬀerentially in the two income inequality series. Essentially
income and income inequality may be a better proxy for underlying
changes in the variables of interest in one country than the other. We know,
for example, that in the United Kingdom the rise in inequality has been
paralleled by marked changes in living arrangements (with many more
single adult households and a doubling in the proportion of households
who are single parents), work patterns (with an increasing polarization of
households into no-earner or two-earner couples), and by changes in the
returns to education, all of which could be thought to be important
changes that would in turn be channeled into health through inequalities
in SES. Evidence on similar changes in the United States is also available,
but it would be particularly interesting to address these mechanisms di-
rectly in the microdata for the two countries and simultaneously control for
the diﬀerences in the changing nature of the income inequality in the two
countries.
A more diﬃcult dimension of changes in inequality to control for is the
degree to which cross-sectional variances in incomes measure permanent
inequality or transitory uncertainty in incomes and any potential diﬀer-
ence in trends of each component across countries. Evidence from the
United Kingdom (Blundell and Preston 1998) suggests an important role
for both components in the rise of income dispersion over recent years, but
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2. For example, in 1997, health care spending was 13.9 percent of the gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) in the United States, of which around half (6.5 percent) was public, and in con-
trast, spending in the United Kingdom was only 6.8 percent of GDP, of which almost all (5.8
percent) was public (Emmerson, Frayne, and Goodman 2000).each component might be thought to be distinct in the sense of the mech-
anisms by which it could lead to changes in health. The instrumenting of
income and the variance of income in the analysis of this paper begin to go
some way to addressing the stripping out of the inequality component, al-
though choice of instruments is always a problem, as pointed out in the au-
thors’ analysis.
Comparative Issues
If more comparative work is to be undertaken in the future it is worth
pointing out that, by deﬁnition, such analysis has to deal with the compa-
rability (and relevance) of the measures employed in the individual coun-
tries and, indeed, of the populations themselves. Given broad similarities
between the United States and the United Kingdom, this is probably not a
particularly important issue for the analysis in this particular paper al-
though I would still like to have seen more on this issue. But, in general, the
deﬁnition of income (gross or net, annual or weekly), equivalence scale, or
education could have diﬀerential eﬀects across countries, particularly to
the extent that international diﬀerences diﬀer across cohorts or change
over time. Nevertheless, this paper shows clearly that comparative avenues
do look very promising. One possible country to add into the picture would
be Germany, which research has shown to have important diﬀerences with
respect to the U.K.-U.S. model. In particular, West Germany has had the
income growth and technical progress of the United States and United
Kingdom but notably without the rise in (wage) inequality during the
1980s that is common to both countries in this current comparison (see
Giles, Gosling, Laisney, and Geib 1998). Such additional variation could
be crucial in understanding the relationships in this paper.
One of the authors’ main conclusions is unchanged between this paper
and its predecessor—there is still much research (and in particular com-
parative research) to be done in this area. The evidence here, coupled with
the promise of further detailed international comparative exercises ad-
dressing potential transmission mechanisms linking SES, mortality, and
morbidity, and the increasing availability of microdata speciﬁcally de-
signed to target this research question, suggests that such future work will
lead to important advances in our understanding of the issue.
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